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The Levels of Confrontation of
Science and the Law
W. Carey Parker
Mr. Parker utilizes a tripartite division in his analysis of the problems facing science and the law. On the operating level, the author recognizes the responsibility of law to act as a guiding force. At the "legal
response time" level, Mr. Parker questions the adaptability of the common law tradition to immediate scientific challenges. Finally, at the
institutional level, the author commends the initial breakthrough made
by some governmental agencies, but he also indicates that other institutional challenges must be met.

WOULD LIKE to distinguish for the purposes of this discussion three different aspects of the confrontation between the
life sciences and the law: the operating level, a level which may be
called the level of "legal response time," and the institutional level.
The operating level is the
level of immediate and most
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this level to make itself aware

of the biological and medical

revolution that is taking place.
We now have only the most dim perception of the challenges that
the wave of discovery in the life sciences has cast upon our beaches.
Professor Wald has given important examples of some of -theproblems facing us in the near and distant future. For example, although the artificial synthesis of human life from its chemical components may still be entirely speculative, the frozen sperm bank is
not. Although biochemistry and physiology may not tomorrow
answer the ancient controversy between free will and determinism,
they may very soon find cures for severe hereditary defects in mental development.
Because some of these examples are dramatic, they have already
received wide currency. It is the first order of business today for
the law to search out the problem areas created for society by the
life sciences. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
for example, has recently organized a Special Committee on Science
and Law, which, as one of its projects, proposes to make precisely
this sort of broad survey of the areas of present and potential future
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interaction between biology and law as a predicate for a more penetrating study of particular problems.
As Professor Wald has recognized, the problems posed by science for law are, in a sense, problems of choice. Not many decades
ago our handling of serious problems, such as life and death, mental
and physical health and disease, family planning, and geriatrics, was
inexorably determined by forces over which we had little or no
control. The life sciences could accomplish relatively little that
affected the health of either man or society. Today, on the other
hand, the life sciences have taught us a great deal about what we
can do. Science has accumulated a large reservoir of indiscriminate
knowledge that offers us alternative methods to halt, modify, or
even reverse many of those forces. But it has not been the function
or theory of science to tell us which alternative we should choose.
It is the law, as the agent of society, that must recognize and weigh
these alternatives and guide man in the exercise of his choice. This
is a role, however, that lawyers cannot exercise alone. The responsibility must be shared with scientists. Too often, the opinion is
voiced that science is too important to be left to the scientists.
At the second level, the level of legal response time, the problems are also acute. Professor Wald has emphasized, in Darwinian
terms, the evolutionary value of rapid adaptability to change. It
may fairly be said that no other institution of society is so well
adapted to resist change as is the Anglo-American legal system. Iq
ancient common law tradition, its adherence to precedent, its lengthy
procedures, and its emphasis on deliberate speed present embarrassing contrasts in a society in which the hallmark of science is impatience with the status quo. We must seriously question whether
our legal and political institutions have the capacity to make timely
responses before the forces of change have already committed our
society to one or another of the paths that were once available.
We may have here, in the social context, an example of what
Professor Wald has described as dangerous overspecialization. The
structure of our modern legal system, in relation to its ability to
respond with appropriate speed to the pressure of scientific change,
was solidified in response -to the demands of the 19th-century industrial revolution. The advanced state of our society testifies dearly
to the ability of society and its legal system to assimilate the technical innovations of the past. Can they do the same for today's
discoveries? There is a risk of adopting an overly egocentric view
by regarding today's scientific challenges as more urgent and de-
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manding than those of the past. At the same time, it would be
alarming if the urgency of today exceeded by any significant amount
the existing legal response time to the problems we face.
An important issue here, then, is the degree to which our present problems are unique. Professor Milton Katz has asked whether
the modern confrontation between science and law today could as
appropriately have been characterized in the past as a confrontation
between "the steamship and the law," between "the wheel and the
law," or even between "fire and the law." What is dear, of course,
is that we are not for the first time awakening to the broad problems posed to ,the structure of society by advancing science and
technology. The new dimension that may recently have been injected into the problem is the rapidity of scientific change and the
corresponding need to increase the tempo of our decisionmaking.
The science of genetics, for example, is almost literally a child of
the 20th century. The threshold laid down by Mendel in 1866
remained uncrossed until 1901, when three groups of researchers
made simultaneous and independent rediscoveries of his work.
More significant, it has only been in the past two decades that the
biochemistry of our genes has become sufficiently understood to
offer us the prospect of actually manipulating our heredity.
A correlative aspect of the level of legal response time is the
difficulty in mobilizing the interest and support of individuals,
groups, and even legislators in solving problems whose predominant
impact will occur only at some time in the future or in another
country. Will we sacrifice today's cigarettes to prevent tomorrow's
cancer, or domestic amenities to cure foreign malnutrition and disease? These are the questions that must concern the lawyers, economists, and educators who are to initiate and guide the direction of
our social evolution.
Bound up with the operational and response time aspects of the
confrontation between the life sciences and the law is the adequacy
of the institutional structure that society uses to answer the questions
raised by science. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., stated, "Science
is a first rate piece of furniture for a man's upper chamber, if he hag
common sense on the ground floor."
The lawyer's instinctive response to a new problem is to improvise with his old tools, not to look for new tools. Experience with
other problems in other areas of the law has shown the need for
new forms of cooperation between federal and state governments
and private organizations. The large commitment of the federal
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government to research in the life sciences has necessarily caused
the creation of new institutions to plan and develop the research
programs. Unfortunately, comparable efforts have not been exerted
toward evaluating the results of such research and guiding its application. In areas such as public health, for example, the timelag
between a discovery in research and its clinical application to patients is easily measured in lives lost. In other areas the dialogues
between science and law at the institutional level are being reshaped
amid continuing controversy by the technological demands of nuclear arms and military power, outer space and environmental pollution. Institutional innovations such as the Office of Science and
Technology, the Federal Council for Science and Technology, the
President's Science Advisory Committee, and the Committee on Science and Public Policy of the National Academy of Sciences were
developed partly in response to the urgency of such problems.
Comparable or different innovations may be required to deal with
the problems created by the life sciences. In areas such as world
population control, it is dear that supranational governmental entities will be needed to make efficient use of our limited resources
for such control. At the local level, the impact of the life sciences
on human health and disease is already overtaxing the existing institutional relationships between the patient and his physician, his
hospital, and his government.
Important as it is to be receptive to the need for new institutions
to deal with science, we must also be alert to detect the involuntary
types of change that may be provoked by science in our existing
institutions. Nowhere in modern science is specialization more
abundant than in the life sciences. The splintering of biological
subspecialties threatens any effort at coordination or overall guidance of research and challenges the efficiency of even the individual
researcher, let alone that of the scientific estate. In other areas, we
must examine the implications for medical institutions and medical
education of the drain of research inclined students away from the
patient and into the laboratory. Can technical achievements in
communications, for example, be harnessed to solve the severe staff
problems in medical education?
Let me con~dude with an example - the challenge of tissue culture genetics to the law of abortion - that illustrates the interaction
between the life sciences and the law at the three levels I have mentioned. The Langdon-Down syndrome, otherwise known as mongolism, is characterized by the presence of an extra 21st chromo-
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some, in the cells of an affected individual. It is caused by an
accident in cell division that appears to take place either in the egg
cell of the mother or in the developing embryo. Recent studies have
also suggested a possible link between chromosomes and crime the presence of an extra Y chromosome in males has been reported
in certain persons who show marked mental retardation, tall stature,
and violent behavior.' Other chromosome abnormalities have also
been discovered, often marked by severe physical and mental handicaps. Such abnormalities are easily detected under the microscope,
and it will soon be feasible to perform such tests on the developing
embryo. Comparable tests will become available for a wide range
of other hereditary defects. Legal questions that arise at the operating level are apparent: How shall our abortion laws be applied once
the certainty of a seriously abnormal offspring is known? Should
we permit the abortion pill? At the response time level, we must
determine to what extent the new chemicals pouring into our environment today are producing the hereditary defects of tomorrow.
At the institutional level, we must ask whether the abortion bureau
should take its place alongside the medical clinic, or whether the
marriage bureau should take on the function of genetic counseling
for its clients.
Similar challenges can be raised in many other areas where the
law meets the life sciences. Who gets the artificial kidney when
not everyone can get it? How long should life be prolonged in the
case of incurable disease? Should drug addicts undergo compulsory
civil commitment for treatment? Should the law force auto drivers
to submit to blood tests for intoxication? Should parents be permitted to select the sex of their children? What standards should
be adopted in medical research on human subjects, especially in circumstances where the knowing and intelligent consent of the subject may vitiate the experiment? Should the federal government
spend federal funds to cure cancer or should it concentrate on heart
disease? Can private scientists and physicians be left to resolve
these questions, or must local, state, and federal agencies become
more directly involved?
The law is only now beginning to plan its response to most of
these challenges. The validity of the answers we reach tomorrow
will depend on whether the questions we ask today are the right
ones.
1 Price & Whatmore, Behavior Disorders and Pattern of Crime Among XYY Males
Identified at a Maximum Security Hospital, 1 BRITISH MEDICAL J. 533-36 (1967).

